Common Carriage’s Domain by Yoo, Christopher S.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
6-22-2018 
Common Carriage’s Domain 
Christopher S. Yoo 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, Computer Law 
Commons, Digital Communications and Networking Commons, Internet Law Commons, Law and 
Economics Commons, Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons, Public Economics Commons, 
Science and Technology Law Commons, Science and Technology Policy Commons, and the Science and 
Technology Studies Commons 
Repository Citation 
Yoo, Christopher S., "Common Carriage’s Domain" (2018). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2016. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2016 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
1 
Common Carriage’s Domain 
Christopher S. Yoo* 
Abstract 
 The judicial decision invalidating the Federal Communications 
Commission’s first Open Internet Order has led advocates to embrace common 
carriage as the legal basis for network neutrality.  In so doing, network neutrality 
proponents have overlooked the academic literature critiquing common carriage 
as well as the lessons from its implementation history.  This Essay distills these 
learnings into five factors that play a key role in promoting common carriage’s 
success: (1) commodity products, (2) simple interfaces, (3) stability and 
uniformity in the transmission technology, (4) full deployment of the transmission 
network, and (5) stable demand and market shares.  Applying this framework to 
the Internet suggests that common carriage is not particularly well suited as a 
basis for regulating broadband Internet access. 
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Introduction 
 The concept of common carriage has played an increasingly important role over the 
course of the debate over the network neutrality.  Network neutrality supporters were initially 
quite hesitant to equate network neutrality with common carriage.1  Over time, however, 
proponents became more amenable to drawing a connection between the two concepts.2  Interest 
in common carriage intensified further following the D.C. Circuit’s 2014 decision in Verizon v. 
FCC striking down portions of the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) 2010 Open 
Internet Order on the grounds that it attempted to mandate restrictions that could be imposed 
only on common carriers.3  Although the FCC appeared initially inclined to base its second Open 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 
5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 16-17, 32-35 (2006) (noting the heavy criticism of common carriage and 
proposing the substitution of a simple antidiscrimination rule); see also Hance Haney, Eric Schmidt and Laurence 
Tribe on Common Carriage and Net Neutrality Regulation, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Aug. 24, 2007), 
http://techliberation.com/2007/08/24/eric-schmidt-and-laurence-tribe-on-common-carriage-and-net-neutrality-
regulation [http://perma.cc/A6BD-JZAU] (quoting Google Chairman and CEO Eric Schmidt during a discussion of 
network neutrality as stating that common carriage would be a mistake and expressing hope that any common carrier 
obligations would be applied “pretty narrowly” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Part 2: Uses for Devices of 
Multiple Capabilities Cannot Always Be Predicted or Channeled, COOK REP. ON INTERNET PROTOCOL, TECH., 
ECON., & POL’Y 71, 91-92 (2006), http://cookreport.com/newsletter-sp-542240406/pdf?download=61:pdf 
[http://perma.cc/F7KK-S3MD] (quoting Vint Cerf as “hesitat[ing]” to characterize “neutrality as the 21st C[entury] 
version of common carriage”); John Windhausen, Jr., Good Fences Make Bad Broadband: Preserving an Open 
Internet Through Net Neutrality, PUB. KNOWLEDGE 38 (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-net-
neutrality-whitep-20060206.pdf (rejecting arguments that network neutrality would replicate common carriage). 
2 See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH:  THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 311 (2010); Susan P. 
Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871 (2009); Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, 
The New Network Neutrality: Criteria for Internet Freedom, 12 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 225, 229, 238 (2008); 
Christian Sandvig, Network Neutrality Is the New Common Carriage, 9 INFO 136 (2007); Moran Yemini, Mandated 
Network Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons from Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 
(2008). 
3 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 656-57 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
3 
Internet Order on another statutory basis,4 a speech by President Barack Obama endorsing 
common carriage as the best statutory basis for implementing network neutrality changed the 
political calculus.5  After some hesitation, the FCC embraced common carriage as the statutory 
basis for network neutrality in its 2015 Open Internet Order, and the D.C. Circuit upheld that 
decision on judicial review.6 
 Network neutrality proponents tend to regard common carriage as a well-established and 
accepted baseline for regulating network industries.  It is true that common carriage regulation 
has long operated successfully in sectors such as water, natural gas, and electric power.7  At the 
same time, uncritical invocations do not adequately reflect the extensive commentary and 
regulatory proceedings identifying the problems and limitations associated with common 
carriage in the telecommunications sector, including definitional difficulties, the lack of 
incentives to economize, the systematic biases it induces, its tendency to stifle innovation and 
facilitate collusion, and its vulnerability to opportunism.8  Indeed, the FCC has recognized the 
flaws in common carriage since at least 1979 and has taken steps to limit its scope.9 
                                                 
4 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, 5647-48 
(2014) (statement of Chairman Tom Wheeler). 
5 The Obama White House, President Obama’s Statement on Keeping the Internet Open and Free, 
YOUTUBE (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKcjQPVwfDk. 
6 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 
30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5724-25 ¶¶ 283-87, 5757-90 ¶¶ 355-408 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order], aff’d 
sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
7 See, e.g., JEFFREY CHURCH & ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A STRATEGIC APPROACH 
§ 26.2.3, at 853-54 (2000); Eli M. Noam, Towards an Integrated Communications Market: Overcoming the Local 
Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 209, 219 (1982). 
8 Christopher S. Yoo, Is There a Role for Common Carriage in an Internet-Based World?, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 
545, 573-605 (2013). 
9 See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations 
Therefor, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 309-10 ¶¶ 1-3 (1979); see also John Haring 
& Evan Kwerel, Competition Policy in the Post-Equal Access Market 5-11 (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y Working 
Paper, 1987), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp22.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ZQZ-AM4F];NTIA 
REGULATORY REV. STAFF, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., NTIA REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES REPORT 13-31 (1987), 
http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/publications/download/87-222_ocr.pdf [http://perma.cc/2MG6-6A2A].  See generally 
Scott M. Schoenwald, Regulating Competition in the Interexchange Telecommunications Market: The 
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 The goal of this article is to use historical examples and the commentary analyzing 
common carriage to identify the points of commonality between common carriage and network 
neutrality, as well as the circumstances under which common carriage is likely to be an 
appropriate regulatory intervention.  Rather than creating a grand theory of common carriage, the 
analysis follows the approach taken by the Supreme Court’s decision in Trinko by taking into 
account the effectiveness of the proposed remedies when determining the scope of liability.10  To 
do so, this article recovers the literature evaluating the efficacy of common carriage11 as well as 
the insights from the history of enforcing nondiscrimination mandates under the antitrust laws to 
synthesize a framework for identifying the circumstances under which common carriage is most 
likely to be effective.  The analysis suggests that common carriage is most effective when five 
circumstances are met: 
1) The product being regulated is a commodity. 
2) The interfaces between the product being regulated and related products are simple. 
3) The transmission technology is uniform and stable. 
4) The transmission network is fully built out. 
5) The demand for each firm producing the regulated product is relatively stable. 
This framework provides a basis for evaluating whether common carriage is an appropriate 
regulatory device to govern the modern Internet both in terms of network neutrality and the 
regulation of cloud computing. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dominant/Nondominant Carrier Approach and the Evolution of Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 367, 375-83 
(1997) (reviewing the regulatory history). 
10 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414-15 (2004). 
11 For textbook discussions of the problems associated with the regulatory tools used to implement common 
carriage, see, for example, DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 672-
78 (3d ed. 2000); CHURCH & WARE, supra note 7, § 26.2.2, at 847-52; 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 27-32 (1970) [hereinafter 1 KAHN].  See generally 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, 
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 11-59, 93-94, 108-12, 325-27 (1971) [hereinafter 
2 KAHN]; W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND 
ANTITRUST 431-36, 560-71 (4th ed. 2005). 
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 Section I provides an overview of the difficulty identifying a coherent theoretical basis 
for common carriage, traces the regulatory development of network neutrality, and identifies the 
points of commonality between the two concepts.  Section II analyzes the five factors identified 
above and evaluates how they affect the key aspects of common carriage regulation. 
I. Common Carriage and Its Relationship with Network Neutrality 
 This Part lays out the concepts of common carriage and network neutrality and analyzes 
the connection between them.  The linkage between the two concepts underscores how the 
practical limitations identified with respect common carriage can help inform the network 
neutrality debate. 
A. The Elusive Definition of Common Carriage 
 Over the years, scholars and courts have repeated attempted to devise a coherent 
framework for determining when common carriage should apply, without much success.12  
Although some early cases suggested that common carriage was appropriate for industries 
“affected with the public interest,” the Supreme Court “discarded” that test, concluding that 
“there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest”13 and that the 
phrase was “not susceptible of definition and form[ed] an unsatisfactory test.”14   
 Other commentators have argued that natural monopoly represents the defining 
characteristic of common carriers.15  Such arguments are contradicted by the fact that common 
                                                 
12 For an excellent survey of this literature, see Thomas Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 67, 79-109 (2008). 
13 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934). 
14 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).  See generally Yoo, supra note 8, at 554-59. 
15 For the seminal argument, see Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust 
Problem, 17 HARV. L. REV. 156, 161 (1904).  For a modern restatements of this position, see U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. 
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carriage mandates have often been applied to firms that lacked monopoly power, such as taxis, 
inns, trucks, and long-haul railroad routes served by multiple providers.16  The lack of centrality 
of market power is further underscored by the fact that the statute defines “telecommunications 
service,” which in turn determines the scope of common carriage,17 in purely technological terms 
without any reference to market power.18 
 Another theory is that common carriers are those companies that hold themselves out as 
being open to the public.19  Not only is this interpretation questionable as a matter of history.20  It 
allows firms who wish to avoid common carriage treatment to do so simply by declaring that it 
did not purport to serve all comers.21 
 Still other commentators have attempted to base a definition of common carriage on the 
fact that it has historically been tied to the transportation and communications industries.22  Not 
only are these definitions not specified clearly enough to provide a basis for determining which 
                                                                                                                                                             
FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 749-54 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Verizon v. 
FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
16 For the seminal statement of this critique, see Edward A. Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. L. REV. 
135, 148 (1914).  For modern restatements, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-
1937, at 131-48 (1991); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1388-89 (1998); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 67, 96-100 (2008); James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 225, 259 (2002). 
17 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2012) (“A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this 
chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.”). 
18 Id. §§ 153(53) (defining “telecommunications service” as “the offering of telecommunications for a fee 
directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the 
facilities used”); id. § 153(50) (defining “telecommunications” as “the transmission, between or among points 
specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information 
as sent and received.”). 
19 For the seminal statement of this argument, see Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of 
Public Service Companies, 11 COLUMN. L. REV. 514, 518-25 (1911).  For a modern restatement ,see Joseph William 
Singer, No Right to Exclude:  Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1282 (1996). 
20 Nachbar, supra note 12, at 86-93. 
21 Yoo, supra note 8, at 553-54. 
22 Crawford, supra note 2, at 885, 915; Nachbar, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 81-84, 109; 
Speta, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 252-53, 255, 257; Richard S. Whitt, Evolving Broadband 
Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 491-92 
(2009); Wu, supra note 1, at 30-31. 
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transportation and communication business fall inside the definition and which ones fall 
outside.23 Moreover, assuming that the historical pedigree somehow legitimizes the classification 
violates Hume’s basic precept that one cannot get an “ought” from an “is.”24 
 The definition of common carriage has proven elusive as a matter of positive law as well.  
The statute contains an unhelpfully circular definition of “common carrier” that includes “any 
person engaged as a common carrier for hire.”25  The judicial decision upholding the 2010 Open 
Internet Order turned to definitions synthesized by the court in the landmark decisions in 
NARUC I and NARUC II.26  NARUC II concluded that “the primary sine qua non of common 
carrier status is a quasi-public character, which arises out of the undertaking to carry for all 
people indifferently.”27  NARUC I held that “a carrier will not be a common carrier where its 
practice is to make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to 
deal” as opposed to “holding oneself out to serve the public indiscriminately.”28 
 The judicial definition of common carriage provides the foundation for two defining 
characteristics of common carriage.  Undertaking to carry all people is often called the duty to 
serve and is reflected in statutory language obligating common carriers to provide 
“communication service upon reasonable request.”29  Serving the public indiscriminately is the 
equivalent of nondiscrimination and is enshrined in the statutory language common carriers from 
“mak[ing] any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges.”30  Indeed, when reviewing the 
                                                 
23 Yoo, supra note 8, at 558-59. 
24 Id. at 558. 
25 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012). 
26 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
27 Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601, 608 (1976) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), quoted in Verizon, 740 F.3d at 651. 
28 Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC I), 525 F.2d 630, 641, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976), quoted in 
Verizon, 740 F.3d at 651. 
29 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012). 
30 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012). 
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FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Order, the D.C. Circuit characterized nondiscrimination as “the basic 
characteristic that distinguishes common carriers from ‘private’ carriers.”31   
 In addition, common carriers typically are subject to rate regulation, reflected in the 
statutory requirement that all charges be “just and reasonable.”32  Courts and commentators have 
characterized rate regulation as one of the essential characteristics of common carriage.33   
 In essence, the judicial definition and the statute suggest that the core elements of 
common carriage are the duty to serve, nondiscrimination, and rate regulation.  Indeed, 
advocates of network neutrality have acknowledged as much.34 
B. Network Neutrality as Reflected in FCC Agency Actions 
 The structure of the governing federal statute establishes a deep connection between 
network neutrality and common carriage.  Title II of the statute defines “telecommunications 
carrier” as “any provider of telecommunications services” and provides that “[a] 
telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this chapter only to the 
extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.”35  “Telecommunications 
service” is defined as “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to 
                                                 
31 Verizon, 740 F.3d at 651; accord id. at 652 (holding that “‘[i]f a carrier is forced to offer service 
indiscriminately and on general terms, then that carrier is being relegated to common carrier status’” (quoting Cellco 
P’ships v. FCC 700 F.3d 534, 547-49 (D.C. Cir. 2012))). 
32 47 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
33 See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229-32 (1994) (calling the tariff-filing 
requirement “the heart of the common-carrier section of the Communications Act” and essential to ensuring 
reasonable rates); ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 643 F.2d 818, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that the statutory requirement of 
just and reasonable rates drew on “the common-law doctrines respecting common carriers”); H.W. Chaplin, 
Limitations upon the Right of Withdrawal from Public Employment, 16 HARV. L. REV. 555, 556-57 (1903) 
(identifying charging reasonable rates as one of the three fundamental duties imposed on common carriers); Joseph 
D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
1323, 1330-31 (1998) (“For almost a century, public utility companies and common carriers had one common 
characteristic: All were required to offer their customers service under rates and practices that were just, reasonable, 
and non-discriminatory.”).  See generally Yoo, supra note 8, at 571 (examining the historical and conceptual ties 
between common carriage and rate regulation). 
34 WU, supra note 2, at 57 (recognizing that common carriage “was a promise to serve any customer willing 
to pay, charge fixed rates, and carry his or her traffic without discrimination”). 
35 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2012). 
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such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the 
facilities used.”36  “Telecommunications” is defined as “the transmission, between or among 
points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or 
content of the information as sent and received.”37   
 Telecommunications service stands in contrast with an alternative statutory definition 
known as “information service,” which the statute defines as “the offering of a capability for 
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available 
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any 
use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications 
system or the management of a telecommunications service.”38  The FCC’s 2017 Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order recently confirmed its longstanding recognition that telecommunications 
service and information service are mutually exclusive categories,39 an interpretation that is 
                                                 
36 Id. § 153(53). 
37 Id. § 153(50). 
38 47 U.S.C. § 153(24). 
39 Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order, WC Docket 17-108 
(adopted Dec. 14, 2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0104/FCC-17-166A1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/XX8C-764A] [hereinafter 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order]. 
10 
confirmed by the legislative history,40 agency practice,41 and was reflected in the Cable Modem 
Declaratory Ruling that the Supreme Court affirmed in Brand X.42 
 As the Supreme Court acknowledged in its 2005 Brand X decision, when enacting the 
definitions of telecommunications service and information service, Congress incorporated the 
regulatory definitions of “basic service” and “information service” the FCC created in the 
Computer II proceeding to regulate data-processing services offered over telephone wires.43  The 
FCC had characterized basic service as “a pure transmission capability over a communications 
path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied information.”44  
The Supreme Court has held that the Computer II definitions are similar and analogous to the 
statutory definitions45 and relied upon the regulatory interpretation of basic service as “pure” and 
“transparent” transmission when evaluating the proper regulatory classification for last-mile 
broadband access.46 
                                                 
40 S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 1-2, 18, 23, 98 (1995) 
41 Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, 
Declaratory Ruling, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5909-11 ¶¶ 19-27 (2007); United Power Line Council’s Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an 
Information Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd. 13281, 13285-86 ¶¶ 8-10 (2006); Appropriate 
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, 14862-65 ¶¶ 12-17, 14909-12 ¶¶ 102-106 (2005), petition for review denied sub 
nom. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007); Petition for Declaratory Ruling That 
AT&T’s Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony Services Are Exempt from Access Charges, Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 7457, 
7460-61 ¶ 6 (2004); Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Section 271 and 272 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, Order on Remand, 16 FCC Rcd. 9751, 9755 ¶ 8, 9770 ¶ 36 (2001); 
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11520-26 ¶¶ 39-48, 
11536-40 ¶¶ 73-82 (1998). 
42 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Internet Over 
Cable Declaratory Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4821-23 ¶¶ 37-38 (2002), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 987-91, 1000 (2005). 
43 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 992. 
44 Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 
Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 420 ¶ 96 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II Final Decision]. 
45 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976; see also id. at 995 (calling “telecommunications service” under the statute and 
“basic service” under Computer II “parallel term[s]”). 
46 Id. at 976, 988, 990-91, 993, 998, 1000. 
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 As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, the statute permits regulating last-mile broadband 
providers as common carriers only if they are providing telecommunications services governed 
by Title II of the statute.47  Simply put, regulations that impose common carrier treatment on 
providers who are not offering telecommunications services “cannot stand.”48  The applicable 
regulatory definition thus plays a key role in determining whether a last-mile broadband provider 
is regarded as a common carrier, which in turn determines whether the agency may subject it to 
the type of regulation associated with common carriage. 
1. Michael Powell’s 2004 Four Freedoms and the 2005 Policy Statement 
 The modern debate on network neutrality began with a speech given by then-FCC 
Chairman Michael Powell in February 2004, in which he laid out four “Internet freedoms” that 
he encouraged companies to embrace.49  Specifically, consumers should have the freedom to (1) 
access content of their choice, (2) use applications of their choice, (3) attach personal devices of 
their choice, and (4) obtain meaningful information about their service plans.50 
 Powell’s vision was not regulatory in focus.  His speech was subtitled, “Guiding 
Principles for the Industry,”51 and a section was subtitled, “Empowering Consumers Without 
Regulating the Internet.”52  Moreover, in the body of his speech, he warned that “the case for 
government imposed regulations regarding the use or provision of broadband content, 
                                                 
47 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
48 Id. at 650. 
49 Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium on 
“The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age”: Preserving Internet 
Freedom:  Guiding Principles for the Industry 5 (Feb. 8, 2004), http://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
243556A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/A3BC-H9QM]. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1. 
52 Id. at 3. 
12 
applications and devices is unconvincing and speculative.”53  Instead, he favored “giv[ing] the 
private sector a clear road map by which it can avoid future regulation on this issue by 
embracing unparalleled openness and consumer choice.”54  He argued that “if we secure a 
reasonable balance between the needs of network providers and internet freedom, consumers will 
reap the benefits of broadband without intrusive regulation.”55  Rather than proposing regulation, 
Chairman Powell was trying to get the industry to act on its own.  As such, it did not need to 
invoke any particular statutory basis for its actions. 
 The four Internet freedoms extolled by Chairman Powell were echoed in the 2005 Policy 
Statement that the FCC issued in conjunction with its decision classifying DSL as an information 
system.56  Specifically, the FCC adopted four principles that it planned to “incorporate . . . into 
its ongoing policymaking activities.”57  These principles stated that consumers are entitled to (1) 
“access the lawful Internet content of their choice,” (2) “run applications and use services of their 
choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement,” (3) “connect their choice of legal devices that 
do not harm the network, and (4) ensure “competition among network providers, application and 
service providers, and content providers.58  The Policy Statement noted in a footnote, “The 
principles we adopt are subject to reasonable network management.”59   
 The 2004 Four Freedoms speech and the 2005 Policy Statement exhibit the initial 
outlines of modern network neutrality.  In focusing on guaranteeing consumers’ right to access 
content, run applications and services, and attach devices, the first three principles provide the 
                                                 
53 Id. at 4. 
54 Id. at 5. 
55 Id. at 6 (emphasis in original). 
56 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 
FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005). 
57 Id. at 14988. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 14988 n.15. 
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foundation for what will become the non-blocking rule.  The fourth freedom in Chairman 
Powell’s speech is clearly the precursor to the modern transparency rule. 
 The Policy Statement was ambiguous as to whether it is treating last-mile broadband 
access as telecommunications service or an information service, discussing both potential bases 
for authority rather noncommittally.60  Determining the precise statutory basis was not that 
important because, as the Policy Statement explicitly acknowledged, the agency was “not 
adopting rules in this policy statement”61 and was simply announcing principles that it would 
“incorporate . . . into its ongoing policymaking activities.”62  The FCC attempted to sanction 
Comcast in 2008 for violating the Policy Statement only to see that action overturned by the D.C. 
Circuit in 2010 for being outside the agency’s authority.63 
2. The 2010 Open Internet Order 
 The loss in the Comcast case and the change in administration prompted the FCC to 
engage in formal rulemaking procedures that culminated in the 2010 Open Internet Order.64  The 
2010 Order implemented network neutrality by adopting three basic rules to fixed broadband 
providers:  (1) The transparency rule required them to “disclose the network management 
practices, performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of their broadband services,” 
offering guidance as to nine types information that should be disclosed.65 (2) The “no blocking” 
rule prohibited them from “block[ing] lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful 
devices, subject to reasonable network management,” which included impairing or degrading 
                                                 
60 Id. at 14987. 
61 Id. at 14988 n.15. 
62 Id. at 14988. 
63 Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-
to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008), vacated sub nom. Comcast 
Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
64 Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010). 
65 Id. at 17906 ¶ 1, 17936-41 ¶¶ 53-61. 
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websites or applications so as to make them “effectively unusable.”66  (3) The “no unreasonable 
discrimination” rule forbids them from “unreasonably discriminat[ing] against transmitting 
lawful network traffic” and identified four considerations to serve as guidance as to what 
constitutes reasonable, including transparency, end-user control, use-agnosticism, and 
compliance with industry standards.67   
 The three rules embodied in the 2010 Open Internet Order capture the primary outline of 
modern network neutrality.  The addition of nondiscrimination had the vocal support of 
Commissioner Michael Copps, who argued for adding nondiscrimination to transparency and 
nonblocking in a series of speeches between 2006 and 2009.68 
 The 2010 Order recognized three exceptions.  First, the rules were subject to reasonable 
network management, guided by the considerations offered to guide what constituted 
unreasonable discrimination rule plus two additional considerations:  ensuring network security 
and integrity and managing network congestion.69  Mobile broadband was subject to the 
transparency rule, but was exempt from the no unreasonable discrimination rule and was subject 
to the no blocking rule only with respect to applications that competed directly with their voice 
                                                 
66 Id. at 17906 ¶ 1, 17941-44 ¶¶ 62-67. 
67 Id. at 17906 ¶ 1, 17944-51 ¶¶ 67-79. 
68 See, e.g., Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13080 (2008) 
(statement of Copps, Comm’r); Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 FCC Rcd. 7894, 7903 (2007) 
(Copps, Comm’r, concurring); Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd. 8203, 8368 (2006) (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting); Michael J. Copps, 
Acting Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Free Press Summit: Changing Media (May 14, 2009), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-290735A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/UMR8-GRCH]; Michael J. 
Copps, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at Pike & Fischer’s Broadband Policy Summit IV (June 12, 
2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-282890A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/NP9N-E3FM]; 
Michael J. Copps, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at En Banc Hearing on Broadband Network 
Management Practices, Stanford University (Apr. 17, 2008), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-281625A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/R5XA-GNMM]; Michael J. 
Copps, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at En Banc Hearing on Broadband Network Management 
Practices, Cambridge, Massachusetts (Feb. 25, 2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
280440A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/HW9V-3HFY]. 
69 Id. at 17908 ¶ 6, 17951-56 ¶¶ 80-92. 
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or video telephony services.70  In addition, the Order acknowledged an exception for specialized 
services, described as video and voice services that share capacity with broadband service.71   
 In terms of statutory authority, the 2010 Order treated last-mile broadband access as an 
information service instead of a telecommunications service.72  The D.C. Circuit accepted the 
statutory basis asserted by the FCC, but held that because nondiscrimination was the 
quintessential common carriage obligation, the agency could mandate nondiscrimination only 
with respect to providers it had classified as providing telecommunications services.73  In 
essence, common carriage and the nondiscrimination mandate that the 2010 Order began treating 
as an essential aspect of network neutrality were inexorably linked, although the court clearly 
signaled that the FCC could implement a similar regime based around the commercial 
reasonableness standard upheld with respect to data roaming.74 
3. The 2015 Open Internet Order 
 The FCC responded to the partial reversal of its 2010 Open Internet Order by 
promulgating a new Open Internet Order in 2015 to govern last-mile broadband access (now 
called broadband Internet access service or BIAS).  The FCC established three new bright-line 
rules that mandated (1) no blocking of lawful content, applications, services, or nonharmful 
devices, subject to reasonable network management, (2) no throttling of Internet traffic on the 
basis of content, application, or service, or use of a non-harmful device, and (3) no paid 
prioritization unless the provider receives a waiver from the FCC.75  The Order backed up these 
bright-line rules with a general conduct standard prohibiting unreasonable interference and 
                                                 
70 Id. at 17908 ¶ 8, 17956-58 ¶¶ 93-96. 
71 Id. at 17908 ¶ 7, 17964-66 ¶¶ 112-114. 
72 Id. at 17967-81 ¶¶ 117-137. 
73 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 655-57 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
74 Id. at 652, 657 (citing Cellco P’ships v. FCC 700 F.3d 534, 547-49 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
75 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 5607-08 ¶¶ 14-18, 5645-58 ¶¶ 104-107, 110-132. 
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disadvantage, to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.76  The first two bright-line rules and the 
general conduct standard are subject to reasonable network management, although the bright-line 
rule against paid prioritization is not.77 
 In addition, the 2015 Order enhanced the transparency rule78 and retained the exception 
for specialized services (now renamed non-BIAS services),79 but abolished the differential 
treatment of mobile broadband, choosing to make technical differences as a consideration to be 
taken into account when determining what constitutes reasonable network management.80  The 
Order made a significant extension by asserting jurisdiction over the terms under which networks 
interconnect with each other, which it planned to regulate on a case-by-case basis.81 
 In terms of legal authority, the FCC broke with the approach it had followed since 2002, 
no longer treating BIAS as an information service and instead reclassifying it as a 
telecommunications service.82  Rather than apply the entire regime governing 
telecommunications services, which was largely developed for traditional voice telephony, the 
FCC chose to apply only six of the statutory provisions and forebore from all other 
requirements.83  The D.C. Circuit upheld both the change in statutory authority and the 
substantive provisions on judicial review.84   
                                                 
76 Id. at 5608-09 ¶¶ 20-22, 5647 ¶ 108, 5659-60 ¶¶ 133-137.  The Order offered guidance for determining 
what constitutes unreasonable interference and disadvantage, including end-user control, competitive effects, 
consumer protection, free expression, application agnosticism, and standard practices.  Id. at 5661-64 ¶¶ 138-145 
77 Id. at 5611 ¶¶ 32-34, 5699-704 ¶¶ 214-224.   
78 Id. at 5609 ¶¶ 23-24, 5647 ¶ 109, 5669-82 ¶¶ 154-185. 
79 Id. at 5611 ¶ 35, 5696-98 ¶¶ 207-213. 
80 Id. at 5650-51 ¶¶ 116-18, 5634-43 ¶¶ 86-101, 5664-65 ¶ 146-149. 
81 Id. at 5610 ¶ 28, 5686-96 ¶¶ 194-206. 
82 Id. at 5612-16 ¶¶ 37-50, 5757-77 ¶¶ 355-387.  The FCC effected the same outcome for wireless broadband 
by reclassifying it as from a Private Radio Service to a Commercial Radio Service.  Id. at 5778-90 ¶¶ 388-408. 
83 Id. at 5616-17 ¶¶ 51-59, 5804-67 ¶¶ 434-542. 
84 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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 Although the names attached to the rules changed slightly, the basic outlines of the 
substantive regulations remained the same.  The 2015 Order retained the transparency and no 
blocking rules.  The nondiscrimination principle added in 2010 was embodied into rules against 
throttling and paid prioritization and a general conduct standard barring unreasonable 
interference and disadvantage.  Once reclassified as a telecommunications service, requiring 
BIAS providers to provide the quintessential common carriage obligation of nondiscrimination 
became unproblematic.  The addition of interconnection represented a new development, but in 
terms of legal authority, it fell naturally from the reclassification of BIAS as a 
telecommunications service, since the statute gives the FCC jurisdiction over how 
telecommunications service providers interconnect with one another.85 
4. The 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order 
 On December 14, 2017, the FCC voted to replace the 2015 Open Internet Order with the 
Restoring Internet Freedom Order.86  The Order retained a refined version of the transparency 
rule,87 but abolished the bright-line rules prohibiting blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization 
along with the general conduct standard.88  The Restoring Internet Freedom Order also 
renounced FCC oversight over interconnection89 and preempted inconsistent state regulation.90  
In terms of legal authority, the Restoring Internet Freedom Order reversed the decision of the 
2015 Open Internet Order embracing common carriage and returned to the original classification 
                                                 
85 See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (giving the FCC the authority to require common carriers “to establish 
physical connections with other carriers” and “to establish [the] routes and charges applicable thereto” when it 
“finds such action necessary and desirable in the public interest”); id. § 251(a)(1) (placing on telecommunications 
carriers the general duty “to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other 
telecommunications carriers”). 
86 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 39. 
87 Id. at 125-40 ¶¶ 209-238. 
88 Id. at 140-78 ¶¶ 239-296. 
89 Id. at 99-106 ¶¶ 163-173.  
90 Id. at 117-23 ¶¶ 194-204. 
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of BIAS as an information service.91  The Senate voted on May 16, 2018, to invoke 
Congressional Review Act to block this Order from taking effect.92  The House of 
Representatives has yet to act on the resolution.  
5. The Tacit Need for Rate Regulation 
 Although Chairman Wheeler repeatedly claimed that the 2015 Open Internet Order did 
not involve rate regulation,93 his later statements made clear that he regarded the authority to 
regulate rates as an essential component of network neutrality.  For example, in a March 2016 
interview, he acknowledged that regulators enforcing network neutrality “still want to have rate 
authority” enforced through ex post review of complaints.94  He also testified before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee that eliminating ex post review of rates would “gut[] the Open 
Internet Order.”95  
 A moment’s reflection makes clear the reasons underlying the FCC’s insistence that some 
form of rate regulation is necessary to make nondiscrimination effective.  Without some 
restriction on overall rates, nondiscrimination would not prevent a vertically integrated provider 
from excluding unaffiliated providers of complementary services.  Instead of singling out 
                                                 
91 Id. at 8-98 ¶¶ 20-161. 
92 164 CONG. REC. S2698 (daily ed. May 16, 2018) 
93 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 5915 (statement of Chairman Tom Wheeler); Tom Wheeler, 
Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the International Institute of Communications Annual Conference 
3 (Oct. 7, 2015), http://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-335877A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/TJ7W-EA28]; 
Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Broadband Communities Summit 3 (Apr. 14, 
2015), http://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-332988A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/X53A-H4Q2]; Tom 
Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law 
Symposium on “The Future of Internet Regulation” 8 (Mar. 27, 2015), 
http://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-332731A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/5FGW-Q67E]. 
94 See Jon Brodkin, Why Tom Wheeler Rejected Broadband Price Caps and Last-mile Unbundling, ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 16, 2016, 8:47 AM), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/03/why-tom-wheeler-
rejected-broadband-price-caps-and-last-mile-unbundling [http://perma.cc/XL3H-ZCAD]. 
95 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th Cong. 35 (2016) (testimony of 
Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
114shrg69104683/pdf/CHRG-114shrg69104683.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2JT-USVQ]. 
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unaffiliated complementary service providers by charging them higher prices, a vertically 
integrated company could simply charge the same high price to both affiliated and unaffiliated 
complementary service providers.  The nondiscriminatory high price would have the same 
exclusionary effect on unaffiliated complementary service providers as would discriminatory 
prices.  At the same time, the uniform higher price would have no adverse effect on the vertically 
integrated company, as any losses resulting higher prices paid by the affiliated complementary 
service provider would simply appear as gains earned by the regulated part of the business.  
Nondiscrimination mandates simply reallocate profits from the complementary service 
subsidiary to the regulated subsidiary.  Parent companies care only about the total profit earned 
and are agnostic about which part of the company earns profits.  A regulator could ban vertical 
integration altogether, but in doing so would run counter to considerable evidence that vertical 
integration is often beneficial to consumers.96   
 Thus nondiscrimination without rate regulation will not prevent vertically integrated 
companies from engaging in exclusionary conduct.97  In short, nondiscrimination would at most 
address some of the symptoms of whatever market power exists without having any impact on 
the sources of that market power.98  That is why there is reason to be skeptical of claims that a 
                                                 
96 For surveys of the empirical literature on vertical integration, see Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 
Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 629, 680 (2007) (finding that “under 
most circumstances, profit-maximizing vertical-integration decisions are efficient, not just from firms’ but also from 
the consumers’ points of view” and calling on “government agencies to reconsider the validity of . . . restrictions” on 
vertical integration). 
97 W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 238-40 (3d ed. 2000); Christopher S. 
Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 192-93 (2002). 
98 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 773 (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 208 (1976); Noam, supra note 7, at 219.  
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simple nondiscrimination mandate without rate regulation would be sufficient to prevent vertical 
exclusion.99   
 It is true that the 2015 Open Internet Order avers at some points that its terms did not 
involve rate regulation,100 as did Chairman Wheeler in his separate statement.101  However, the 
later part of the Order clearly indicates that it eschewed only ex ante rate regulation,102 as the 
dissenting Commissioners pointed out103 and one of the majority Commissioners conceded.104  
Claims that ex post review does not constitute rate regulation ignores the Supreme Court’s 
recognition in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan that ex post liability can be just 
as restrictive as ex ante prohibitions.105  They also ignore the fact the FCC has used ex post 
review as the standard tool for evaluating the reasonableness of rates of all telecommunications 
services since the demise of tariffing in 1996.106   
C. The Connection Between Common Carriage and Network Neutrality 
 The foregoing reveals the extent to which the concepts of common carriage and network 
neutrality are tied at both a statutory and a conceptual level.  In terms of the governing statute, 
                                                 
99 See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Is Uber a Common Carrier?, 12 I/S:  J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 135, 148-51 
(2015); Wu, supra note 1, at 43-44. 
100 The FCC first asserted its claim that the 2015 Open Internet Order would not constitute rate regulation in 
an op-ed published in Wired prior to the adoption of the Order.  Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler:  This 
Is How We Will Ensure Net Neutrality, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/fcc-
chairman-wheeler-net-neutrality [http://perma.cc/Y7PH-JR3N].  The Order also repeatedly emphasized the lack of 
rate regulation.  2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 5603 ¶ 5, 5612 ¶ 37, 5775 ¶ 382. 
101 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
102 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 5809 ¶¶ 441-443, 5814 ¶ 445, 5814 ¶ 452, 5842 ¶ 499, 5846-47 
¶ 508, 5854-55 ¶ 519. 
103 Id. at 5922 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai); id. at 6000 (dissenting statement of 
Commissioner Michael O’Rielly). 
104 Id. at 5918 (implicitly acknowledging the presence of ex post rate regulation by pointing out “how high the 
bar is when it comes to the FCC intervening on rates and charges” and emphasizing that the agency has rarely 
overturned rates outside the context of inmate calling or a tariff investigation). 
105 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
106 Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Implementation of Section 254(g) 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 20730, 20743 ¶ 21, 
20746 ¶ 26 (1996) (discussing FCC’s ability to use its ex post complaint authority to resolve discrimination claims, 
even in the absence of filed tariffs), aff’d sub nom. MCI Worldcom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (2000). 
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the FCC may treat a last-mile broadband provider as a common carrier only if it is providing 
telecommunications services.  Because the nondiscrimination is the quintessential common 
carriage remedy, the agency may not subject a provider to a nondiscrimination mandate unless it 
classifies it as a telecommunications carrier. 
 The similarity of the two categories at the conceptual level makes it unsurprising that the 
statute treats them as interrelated.  The duty to serve identified by the courts as one of the 
defining aspects of common carriage is the equivalent of the no blocking obligation that was the 
heart of the 2005 Policy Statement and the 2010 and 2015 Open Internet Orders.  The no 
unreasonable discrimination rule of the 2010 Open Internet Order and its various renamed 
incarnations in the 2015 Open Internet Order (including also the ban on throttling and paid 
prioritization and the general conduct standard against unreasonable interference or 
disadvantage) are the equivalent of the obligation to provide indiscriminate service that the 
courts have identified as one of the signature characteristics of common carriage.  In addition, 
regulators implementing common carriage and the FCC implementing network neutrality both 
regard some degree of at least ex post rate regulation as essential to both regulatory approaches.  
That is why commentators on both sides of the network neutrality debate have regarded common 
carriage and network neutrality as equivalent.107 
                                                 
107 For statements of network neutrality proponents drawing the equivalence between network neutrality and 
common carriage, see, for example, SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE:  THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND 
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II. Factors that Make Common Carriage More Appropriate 
 The recognition of the connection between common carriage and network neutrality 
suggests that the implementation of network neutrality would likely benefit from an appreciation 
of the circumstances under which common carriage has proven more likely to benefit consumers.  
Rather than repeat past efforts to identify a grand foundational theory of common carriage and 
apply it from the top down, this article offers a more pragmatic, bottom-up approach that 
examines the limits of the instruments used to implement common carriage and c the 
circumstances under which it is more likely to succeed and more likely to fail.  The critique of 
common carriage appearing in the scholarly literature suggests the existence of five conditions 
that must be satisfied if common carriage is to be given the best chance of success. 
A. The Commodity Nature of the Regulated Product 
 The first consideration that makes common carriage more effective is whether the 
product being regulated is a commodity.  The nature of the product has an impact on both the 
implementation of nondiscrimination as well as the effectiveness of rate regulation. 
1. Nondiscrimination 
 Nondiscrimination is considerably harder to enforce when the regulated product is not a 
commodity.  In essence, nondiscrimination requires providers to charge the same price to all 
customers buying the same product.  Stated somewhat more formally, the textbook definition of 
price discrimination is a price differential that is not justified by variations in cost or product 
quality and is instead based on buyers’ willingness to pay.108  Thus, the nondiscrimination 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
489 (3d ed. 1990); Hal Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 870, 870-75 (1985). 
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mandate of common carriage “is not concerned with price differentials between qualitatively 
different services or service packages.”109 
 Every agency enforcing a nondiscrimination mandate must thus face the threshold 
inquiry whether or not the products being sold to two different customers are the same product or 
different products, whether a price difference exists between the two products, and if so whether 
that price difference is reasonable,110 as differences in the products being sold may justify 
different prices.  Likeness is determined by “functional equivalence,” measured by whether 
“consumers view them as performing the same functions.”111 Price differences can be justified 
by higher levels of service, which are functionally equivalent to a price discount.112 When quality 
varies, nondiscrimination requires regulators to determine whether services are “functionally 
equivalent” from the perspective of the customer.113 
 This inquiry is relatively simple when the product is well defined and uniform.  
Complexity in the product makes this exercise more complex.  For example, in Competitive 
Telecommunications Association, the D.C. Circuit found that selling packaged bundles of 
services at lower rates was justified because permit customers with “a business reason, such as 
security or service quality, for wanting to avoid satellite or microwave communications paths” 
received higher provisioning services by virtue of their ability to control the path taken.114  Also, 
products that were the product of extensive negotiations between the network provider and a 
                                                 
109 Competitive Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1058, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) 
(2012) (prohibiting price discrimination only among “different purchasers of commodities of like grade and 
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110 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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large commercial customer that reflected that customer’s particular needs were also properly 
regarded as different products.115 
 The applications that dominated the early Internet—email and web browsing—were 
relatively modest in terms of the quality of services that they demanded from the network.  
Because both were essentially file transfer programs, their performance was determined 
exclusively by the timing of when the last packet arrived.116  In this era, broadband quality was 
largely determined by bandwidth.   
 Modern broadband Internet access services are much more diverse.  Computer scientists 
now regard the quality of broadband service as varying along at least four dimensions: 
1) Bandwidth is the carrying capacity of the network connection, typically measured in 
megabits per second (Mbps). 
2) Latency/delay is the amount of time an application takes to begin operating following 
the initiation of the service. 
3) Jitter is instability in the pattern in which packets arrive, typically characterized by 
variations in the temporal spacing between consecutive packets. 
4) Reliability is determined by the percentage of packets that are transmitted that 
successfully arrive at their destination.117 
 The applications that are emerging on the modern Internet are more demanding in terms 
of these other dimensions of quality of service than email and the World Wide Web (see Table 
1).  For example, streaming video and audio are quite sensitive to jitter, but are less sensitive to 
reliability.  Interactive video and audio are similarly sensitive to jitter, but are also more sensitive 
to latency than are streaming media services.118 
Table 1:  Quality of Service Demands of Traditional Internet Applications119 
Application Bandwidth Reliability Delay Jitter 
                                                 
115 Id. at 1063-64. 
116 CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET:  HOW TECHNOLOGY, USERS, AND BUSINESS ARE 
TRANSFORMING THE NETWORK 23 (2012). 
117 Id. at 23-24; ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS § 5.4.1, at 397 (4th ed. 2003). 
118 YOO, supra note 116, at 24-27. 
119 Id. at 26 tbl.2-2 
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E-mail Low High Low Low 
File transfer Medium High Low Low 
Streaming audio Medium Low Low High 
Streaming video High Low Low High 
Voice over IP Low Low High High 
Interactive video High Low High High 
 
 Waiting in the wings are a host of applications associated with the emerging Internet of 
Things (IoT), such as smart meters, smart grids, video surveillance, and smart homes.  These 
applications are demanding still different combinations of services from the network (see Table 
2).  The variations in service constitute one reason that the FCC had long declined to impose 
common carriage regulation on enhanced services.120  These considerations seem even more 
important today. 
Table 2:  Quality of Service Demands of Emerging Internet Applications121 
Application Bandwidth Reliability Delay Jitter 
Smart metering Low Medium High Low 
SCADA High High Low Low 
Video 
surveillance 
High High Medium High 
Mobile 
workforce 
Low High Low Low 
Smart homes Low Medium Low Low 
 
 It is thus unsurprising that network providers are increasingly exploring different forms 
of prioritized service.  Many video and VoIP services employ protocols such as Differentiated 
Services (DiffServ) and MultiProtocol Label Switching (MPLS) to deploy voice and video 
services.122  Indeed, such services have been part of the Internet’s central design from the outset, 
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as demonstrated by the inclusion of the type of service field in the Internet Protocol version 4 
(IPv4) specifically to accommodate prioritization of services.123  These capabilities were retained 
and even augmented in the transition to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), which retained a 
traffic class field to provide the functionality associated IPv4’s type of service field and added a 
flow label field to accommodate the types of routing policies associated with MPLS.124  
Organizations that have traditionally been quite skeptical of previous attempts to offer services 
with differential quality of service have begun to offer virtual circuit services on a set-up and 
take-down basis, such as Internet2’s Interactive On-demand Network (ION).125  The need for 
more sophisticated services also explains the widespread belief that common carriage regulation 
would be harmful to cloud computing.126  The need for higher quality of service also animates 
much of the planning around 5G deployments.127 
 In addition, it has long been recognized that wireless connections drop packets much 
more frequently than fixed-line connections.128  Thus, the quality of service provided via 
wireless networks is less reliable.  Moreover, to the extent that recovery from reliability relies on 
the traditional requirement that the host resends the packet, lower reliability will lead to greater 
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delay.129  In addition, satellite broadband is irreducibly subject to greater latency.  The increasing 
practice of network providers to combine different transmission technologies in ways that are 
opaque to consumers causes quality of service to vary across different dimensions. 
 The limitation and standardization of service classes associated with common carriage 
regulation would represent significant impediments to these developments.  History has shown 
that customers are demanding increasingly diverse solutions.130  Indeed, the lack of common 
carriage provided new entrants in traditional voice services known as Competitive Access 
Providers (CAPs) with a key competitive advantage that gave them greater flexibility in 
providing what consumers needed.131  Regulators evaluating nondiscrimination claims would 
have to decide not only if the products are the same, but also whether any price differentials are 
reasonable in light of differences in quality or cost. 
 The literature also reveals that the standardization associated with common carriage can 
have the unintended consequence of facilitating collusion.132  Collusion performs best when 
products are standardized, prices are visible, and secret discounting is impossible, while cartels 
are most effectively destabilized by unsystematic price discrimination.  Requiring providers to 
adhere to defined products and a posted, uniform rate schedule provides the type of 
standardization and information sharing that has long been recognized as a facilitating practice 
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for collusion.133  Preventing providers from charging less than as well as more than posted prices 
can harm consumers by displacing any discounts they may be able to negotiate134 and can even 
turn the agency into a cartel enforcer.135  In addition, posting requirements allow providers to sit 
back and receive advance notice of competitors’ price cuts and any innovations in their business 
models.136  That is why “an antidiscrimination law rigidly imposed on a cartelized market 
provides the means for effective cartel control.”137 
 Lastly, nondiscrimination can turn uniform pricing into both a price floor as well as a 
price ceiling that can harm consumers.  Exemplified by the fixed rate doctrine, in which the 
tariffed price constitutes the entire contract that brooks no deviations in either direction, this 
vision of nondiscrimination that prevents individualized discounts as well high prices hurts 
consumers.  As a result, it can turn nondiscrimination into a sword that hurts consumers as well 
as a shield that protects consumers.138 
                                                 
133 Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Market, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627, 
2644 ¶ 143 (1990) [hereinafter IXC Competition NPRM].  For Supreme Court decisions identifying information 
sharing as a practice that facilitates collusion, see United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); 
Sugar Institute v. United States, 287 U.S. 553, 598 (1936); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 
(1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410 (1921). For a general discussion on 
how information sharing facilities collusion, see SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 108, at 348. 
134 See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone 
Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 84-85 (2008). 
135 Yoo, supra note 8, at 604. 
136 Pitsch & Bresnahan, supra note 130, at 482-83 (citing IXC Competition NPRM, supra note 133, at 2644 
¶ 143); Schoenwald, supra note 9, at 415-16 (citing Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common 
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 
453 ¶ 26 (1981)). 
137 PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION:  THE TRUNK-LINE RAILROAD CARTELS 
AND THE ICC BEFORE 1900, at 204 (1965). 
138 Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Rate Shield:  Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. 
REV. 1591 (2003). 
29 
2. Rate Regulation 
 Rate regulation also faces serious challenges when the product being regulated is 
complex instead of simply being a commodity.139  When the product is a commodity, regulators 
need only oversee a single dimension—price—in order to limit the regulated firm’s ability to 
extract surplus.  The situation is quite different when the regulated product varies in quality, 
where the provider has the incentive to avoid rate regulation by skimping on quality.140  The 
initial models suggest that regulating maximum prices reduces the quality for customers with 
low willingness to pay, but increases the quality for customers with high willingness to pay, 
which makes the welfare implications ambiguous.141  Later extensions showed that when 
providers offer a higher tier of unregulated services in addition to the lower tier of rate regulated 
services, rate regulation on the lower tier can cause the provider to remove products from the 
bundle of products subject to price regulation and the increase in prices on the unregulated 
tier.142 
 The commentary on common carriage has recognized that rate regulation is more 
problematic when the regulated product exhibits significant variations in quality.143  The 
difficulties associated with imposing rate regulation on non-commodity products are also 
illustrated by the empirical literature studying the U.S. experience with regulating the rates 
charged for basic cable television service.  These studies have found that while rate regulation 
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caused nominal cable prices to fall, it also induced differences in quality, reflected in the total 
number and quality of channels offered.  Once rates are adjusted for quality, the empirical 
evidence indicates that rate regulation actually caused quality-adjusted rates to rise.  Conversely, 
rate deregulation caused quality-adjusted rates to fall.144 
 Simply put, the welfare implications of rate regulation for non-commodity products are 
complex and ambiguous.  The potential to vary quality allows the regulated provider to avoid 
rate regulation by degrading its product.  In theory, these degradations could be avoided if the 
regulator engages in comprehensive regulation of minimum quality.  Such quality standards are 
difficult to implement and struggle to account for endogenous changes in the quality of higher-
tier services. 
 This is why common carriage regulation works best when the product is a commodity 
and where the quality of the product does not vary.  This has historically been true for water, 
natural gas, and electric power.145  It is also true for traditional telephone calling, which simply 
requires latencies of less than 300 milliseconds under the quality guidelines established by the 
International Telecommunications Union.146  It is less true for modern Internet services, in which 
quality varies in multiple dimensions. 
B. The Simplicity of the Interfaces Surrounding the Regulated Product 
 The performance of common carriage regulation also depends on the nature of the 
interface between the product being regulated and related products.  Both nondiscrimination and 
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rate regulation function best when such interfaces are simple and struggle when such interfaces 
are complex. 
1. Nondiscrimination 
 The tractability of disputes over what constitutes nondiscriminatory access depends in no 
small part on the relative complexity of the interface between the company seeking access and 
the company providing access.147  The parties are likely to disagree not only about access prices, 
but also about nondiscrimination with respect to a wide range of non-price terms and conditions 
as well.148  The more complex the interface, the more problematic and protracted these disputes 
will be. 
 The impact of the complexity of the interface on the implementation of nondiscrimination 
mandate is demonstrated eloquently by the FCC’s experience attempting to require AT&T to 
provide nondiscriminatory access to unaffiliated long distance providers.  The complexity and 
information-richness of the interface of the boundary between long distance service and the local 
service needed to connect to that service “permitted a thousand ways in which a reluctant Bell 
System local access provider could hamper and restrict potential long distance competitors.”149  
The result is that long distance access was plagued by complaints that about non-price terms, 
such as delays by the incumbent in provisioning lines for new subscribers signed up by 
competitors and the number of digits required to access long distance services.150   
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 Similar problems plagued the implementation of the provision of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that required incumbent local exchange carriers to provide 
nondiscriminatory access to all elements of their networks at any technically feasible point.151  
Mandating access to unbundled network elements (UNEs) deep inside a network that the 
provider was not offering as a separate service ensured that interface would be quite complex.  
Justice Breyer’s dissent in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board noted that the administrative and social 
costs of overseeing such a mandate are likely to be considerable.152   
 These concerns were later embraced by the full Supreme Court in Trinko, which also 
arose from complaints that the incumbent was provisioning competitors’ lines too slowly.153  The 
Court noted that “the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are 
myriad.”154  Distinguishing between the two is particularly difficult to evaluate when disputes are 
“highly technical” and “extremely numerous, given the incessant, complex, and constantly 
changing interaction” between the parties seeking connection to the network and the network.155  
The resulting complexity can lead to “death by a thousand cuts” that regulators will be hard 
pressed to oversee.156 
 Changes in the Internet’s architecture mean that the interconnection of different networks 
is becoming increasingly complex.  Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that used to connect only 
through a single network are now connecting through multiple networks through practices such 
as multi-homing, secondary peering, and other creative arrangements.  In addition, the growing 
use of third-party and proprietary data centers, content distribution networks (CDNs), and other 
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solutions that use storage in innovative ways to reduce the burden on the network are requiring 
new interfaces, complete with ways to provision and meter the services provided.157 
 Furthermore, the Law of Requisite Variety teaches that the growing demand for 
increasingly diverse services will create the need for increasingly complex interfaces to provide 
the needed functionality, because the number of levers in the interface must necessarily match 
the number of potential disturbances if the system is to maintain homeostasis.158  These pressures 
in turn create pressure for the interfaces and the distribution of functions to change.159  In 
addition, the growing variety of network topologies makes the problems even more complex.160  
The net result is to make the nondiscrimination mandate associated with common carriage even 
more difficult to implement.  To the extent that variations in the interfaces exist, enforcement of 
nondiscrimination requires determining how much of a disparity in price those differences would 
justify. 
2. Rate Regulation 
 The complexity of the interface is also likely to have an adverse impact on rate 
regulation.  Common carriage applies in a meaningful way only when one of the parties does not 
want to enter into a business relationship with the other party.  The relationship is thus likely to 
be plagued by disputes over the reasonableness of prices.161  As noted earlier, such disputes are 
likely to extend to a wide variety of non-price conditions as well.162   
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 In this regard, the FCC’s experience in enforcing leased access to cable television 
systems is instructive.  The service has gone largely unused, with the parties disagreeing over 
whether prices are excessive and whether restrictions on non-price terms and conditions are too 
restrictive.163  It also provides a largely unappreciated explanation of why unbundled access to 
local telephone networks proved unsuccessful:  The statute analyzed access entirely in terms of 
the economics of replicability without taking into account the complexity of the interfaces and 
the interdependencies that for technical reasons made certain clusters of tasks into transaction-
free zones.164 
 Similar concerns are likely to arise with respect to network neutrality.  The complexity of 
the interface is likely to require fairly comprehensive oversight of the entirety of the business 
relationship between the companies seeking access and the companies providing it.165  The 
growing intensity and heterogeneity of the demands on the network and the inevitable increase in 
the complexity of the interface makes this aspect of common carriage increasingly challenging to 
oversee. 
C. Stability and Uniformity in the Transmission Technology 
 Commentators have long recognized that common carriage functions best when the 
transmission technology is relatively static and uniform.  Conversely, common carriage faces 
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considerable difficulties when different providers use different technologies and when those 
technologies are in a state of flux. 
1. Nondiscrimination 
 Consider first how non-uniformity and dynamism in transmission technologies make 
nondiscrimination hard to implement.  Recall that the textbook definition of price discrimination 
is a variation in price that is not justified by differences in cost or product quality.166  This 
requires not only a comparison of the relevant products.  It also requires a comparison of the 
underlying production technologies used to create the products or services.  Such comparisons 
are relatively simple when production technologies are uniform and stable and when the costs of 
providing service do not vary customer to customer or from provider to provider.  They become 
considerably more difficulty when production technologies differ or when the costs of serving 
different customers varies. 
 In the case of water, natural gas, and electric power, the transmission technologies have 
long been relatively stable and uniform.167  The same is not true with the Internet. Different 
providers employ a wide array of technologies, such as cable modems, digital subscriber lines 
(DSL), fiber-to-the-home, and wireless broadband.168  Increasingly, providers are also combining 
different technologies together.  For example, wireless broadband providers are increasingly 
shedding load from their cellular broadband networks by configuring their networks to 
seamlessly migrate traffic to WiFi supported by fixed-line connections.169  In addition, AT&T’s 
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acquisition of DirecTV has permitted it to provide over-the-top distribution for video content that 
used to be carried exclusively on DirecTV’s satellite network.170 
 Moreover, the cost of providing service can vary from customer to customer even when 
they are employing the same transmission technology.  As an initial matter, rate averaging means 
that urban and rural consumers pay the same prices despite the real costs of providing rural 
service are much higher than the costs of providing urban service.  Charging consumers the same 
price when their real costs differ represents another, less obvious, form of discrimination.171  
This is why the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that charging urban and rural customers 
the same price in the name of promoting universal service represents “state-sanctioned 
discrimination.”172 
 Another source of cost variation is congestion.173  The design of many broadband 
networks requires end users to share bandwidth locally.174  This allows a small number of super-
heavy users to impose significant congestion costs on the other users sharing the same node.175  
Charging customers the same price despite the fact that the congestion costs caused by their 
activities differs is a form of discrimination.176  Techniques to remediate such behavior, such as 
data caps, are often greeted with claims that they are a form of discrimination designed to harm 
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streaming video services in an attempt to protect legacy cable revenues.177  Given that Netflix 
and YouTube by themselves occupy more than 50% of the available primetime downstream 
bandwidth makes it inevitable that any attempt to curb congestion will have a limiting effect on 
online video.178  Moreover, such efforts are cost-justified measures that comply with the 
principles of nondiscrimination.179  Indeed, the differences in cost suggest that the failure to 
impose usage-sensitive pricing would be more properly regarded as discriminatory than would 
the imposition of such measures. 
 Differences in transmission technology thus imply that charging customers different 
prices for what appears to be the same service may be reasonable.  Regulators charged with 
enforcing nondiscrimination must be able to discern the nature of the differences and assess what 
price differentials might be justified. 
2. Rate Regulation 
 Dynamic change in the transmission technologies greatly complicates the process of rate 
regulation as well.180  One of the longest standing disputes under common carriage is over 
whether rates should be based on historical cost or replacement cost.181  Commentators have long 
recognized that replacement cost better reflects the state of the art technology and provides more 
appropriate signals of when companies should self-provision their facilities instead of seeking 
access to the existing network.  The problem has long been that replacement cost is hard to 
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implement, requiring extended battles between experts disputing over the hypothetical costs of a 
hypothetical network comprised of the best available technology.  Historical cost has the 
advantage of being easier to implement and has been more widely employed.182  When 
technology is relatively static, the wedge between replacement cost and historical cost remains 
relatively narrow.  The more technology is changing, the bigger the wedge between historical 
cost and replacement cost becomes.183 
 All of this was on full display when the FCC was developing rules to implement the 1996 
amendments to the Pole Attachments Act.  The FCC recognized that it had used replacement cost 
methodologies when it was important to provide accurate cost signals about whether new 
entrants should build their own networks or rely on those of incumbents.184  However, such 
considerations were less important when the transmission technology is relatively static.  Indeed, 
when that is the case, historical and replacement cost methodologies are likely to yield similar 
results.185   
 The FCC’s reasoning thus recognizes that the tools of common carriage are considerably 
easier to apply when the transmission technology is stable.  That is not the case with the modern 
Internet, in which multiple transmission technologies are vying for customers and in which there 
have been dramatic shifts in the technologies used to access the Internet over time.186  This will 
intensify further as fiber-to-the-home, 4G LTE, and 5G continue to deploy. 
                                                 
182 For the classic statement, see Mo. ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 292-302, 
308-10 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
183 Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era:  Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and 
Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 227-28, 251-52 (1984). 
184 Amendments of the Commission’s Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Consolidated Partial 
Order on Reconsideration, 16 FCC Rcd. 12103, 12117-18 ¶ 23 (2001) [hereinafter Consol. Reconsideration Order]. 
185 Id. at 12118 ¶ 24. 
186 YOO, supra note 116, at 37-50. 
39 
D. Whether the Transmission Network Is Fully Built Out 
 Another critical determinant of the efficacy of common carriage regulation is the extent 
to which the transmission network is already built out and fully amortized.  Common carriage is 
less well suited when the network requires significant capital expenditures to extend or upgrade 
it. 
1. Nondiscrimination 
 Requirements of nondiscriminatory access can have a dramatic impact on the incentives 
to invest in new infrastructure.  The theoretical arguments of how network sharing requirements 
can create a tragedy of the commons that dampens investment incentives are well rehearsed187 
and supported by a burgeoning empirical literature.188  Although the empirical literature on the 
subject is the most extensive with respect to unbundling,189 the basic intuitions apply to all forms 
of infrastructure sharing. 
 The Supreme Court has similarly recognized that compelling network owners to share 
their networks “may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those 
economically beneficial facilities.”190  What is less well recognized is the extent to which access 
mandates create adverse selection problems.  Competitors can avoid making any investments and 
instead simply obtain access to resources that have proven to be economically viable.  Access 
regimes thus allow competitors to make decisions ex post after the ex ante risks have been 
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validated one way of the other.191  Access regimes can also increase sorting costs by allowing 
competitors to wait and see which geographies prove viable.   The reality that access regimes 
require those making initial investments to share access to those areas that prove successful 
while bearing all of the losses on those regions that prove unsuccessful further dampens 
investment.192 
 More fundamentally, all industries with high fixed costs and low marginal costs face a 
long-recognized pricing problem that can adversely affect investment incentives.193  If a product 
facing low or zero marginal costs is to break even, every unit must be priced to recover some 
share of the fixed cost as well as the marginal cost.  The problem is that by forcing prices above 
marginal cost, any allocation of fixed cost necessarily creates some deadweight loss.  On the 
other hand, pushing prices closer to marginal cost reduces incentives to invest.194  As Frank 
Ramsey recognized nearly a century ago, such problems can be eliminated if a higher proportion 
of the fixed costs are allocated to price insensitive customers, whose consumption will not drop 
significantly even if charged higher prices, and a lower proportion of the fixed costs are allocated 
to price sensitive customers.195 
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 This is why economists generally recognize that demand-side price discrimination is a 
necessary condition to efficient market provision of intellectual property.196  Commentators have 
drawn similar conclusions with respect to network industries.197  A broad nondiscrimination 
mandate would prevent this solution from being realized.  Such considerations are less relevant if 
the relevant networks are fully built out and entry by subsequent competitors is infeasible.  They 
play a key role, however, when investment in new network capacity represents a key policy goal. 
2. Rate Regulation 
 Rate regulation can also have a negative impact on investment incentives and thus pose 
significant problems in the network is not yet built out.  Simply put, short-run supra-competitive 
prices play a critical positive role in signaling industry actors that the relevant markets are in 
disequilibrium and attract the investment that shifts out the supply curve to bring the market back 
into equilibrium. 
 The reasons for this tradeoff are familiar to anyone who has taken Economics 101.  The 
basic equilibrium dynamics are depicted in Figures 1 and 2, with the industry-level dynamics 
depicted in the left-hand graph and the firm-level dynamics depicted in the right-hand graph.  
Assume that a market finds itself in disequilibrium, perhaps because a change in demand causes 
the demand curve to shift outwards.   
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Figure 1:  Short-Run Disequilibrium from an Exogenous Shock 
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 The result in the short run is that prices will rise, as the market attempts to allocate supply 
that has become all-too scarce.  Maintaining the previous price would simply induce shortages, 
as the new demand at that price would far outstrip the available supply.  The higher price also 
allows the competing firms to earn above-cost returns.  If entry is infeasible, the new equilibrium 
will be stable.  If entry is feasible, however, the resulting profits attract investments in new 
production capacity that shifts the supply curve outward until the profits are dissipated and the 
market once again returns to long-run equilibrium. 
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Figure 2:  Return to Long-Run Equilibrium Through Outward Shift in the Supply Curve 
Q (units)
P ($/unit)
MC
AC
D’
Q (000s units)
P ($/unit)
P
CS
PS
S
S’
P MR
 
 Consider the critical role played by supra-competitive prices and supra-competitive 
returns.  These prices and returns signal other actors that the market is in disequilibrium, and the 
desire to share in the supra-competitive profits provides the incentive for producers to make the 
additional investments in production capacity that causes the supply curve to shift outward.  
Moreover, if entry is feasible, such supra-competitive prices and profits should not persist.  
Conversely, if prices are not permitted to rise, such investments will not occur, and the shortages 
will become persistent.  On the other hand, if entry is infeasible, investments in additional 
capacity will never occur, and protecting investment incentives serves little use. 
 This is why Justice Breyer recognized in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board that “a sharing 
requirement may diminish the original owner’s incentive to keep up or to improve the property 
by depriving the owner of the fruits of value-creating investment, research, or labor.”198  He 
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further observed that one cannot “guarantee that firms will undertake the investment necessary to 
produce complex technological innovations knowing that any competitive advantage deriving 
from those innovations will be dissipated by the sharing requirement.”199  He similarly noted in 
Verizon v. FCC that compelling incumbents to share the cost-reducing benefits of a successful 
innovation destroys the incumbent’s incentives to innovate in the first place.200  
 The entire Supreme Court later embraced Justice Breyer’s concerns about access 
requirements’ impact on the incumbents’ incentives to reinvest in their network in its 2004 
Trinko decision, which recognized, “The mere possession of monopoly power, and the 
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of 
the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—
is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces 
innovation and economic growth,” including through investments in infrastructure.  Because of 
that, “[c]ompelling such firms to share the source of their advantage . . . may lessen the incentive 
for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.”201 
 The dampening of investment incentives matters less when the network is already built 
out.  When that is the case, employing rate regulation that dampens investment signals is less 
important.  Moreover, if further entry is impossible, then short-run high prices will not stimulate 
new entry sufficient to shift out the supply curve and dissipate the supra-competitive returns. 
 Again, the implementation of the 1996 amendments to the Pole Attachments Act 
illustrates the issue.  As noted earlier, the issue was whether to employ the more market-oriented 
methodology based on replacement cost or the more easily implemented methodology based on 
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historical cost.  The FCC recognized that even though replacement cost would have provided 
more accurate signals about whether new entrants should invest in their own networks instead of 
relying on the incumbents’, such considerations were less important in the context of pole 
attachments because local regulation and prohibitive cost make construction of a second network 
of poles infeasible.  When “attachers . . . do not face a realistic ‘make or buy’ decision, the 
benefits of giving proper cost signals to new entrants are less pronounced.”202 
 The propriety of rate regulation thus turns in part on whether the network has already 
been constructed or requires additional investment.  When the central problem is stimulating 
additional capital expenditures, short-run supra-competitive prices play a critical role in 
stimulating the necessary investment.  On the other hand, if rate regulation succeeds in ratcheting 
down prices to competitive levels when entry is possible, it risks substantially dampening both 
competitors’ and the incumbent’s incentive to invest in expanding or improving its network 
infrastructure. 
E. Stability in the Demand for Each Firm’s Production 
 Lastly, common carriage functions best when the demand for each firm’s production 
remains relatively stable.  Unit prices are traditionally set by determining a firm’s overall 
revenue requirement and then dividing that requirement by the expected quantity demanded for 
that firm’s services.  Firms can enjoy substantial windfalls or suffer from drastic shortages 
should the sales volume deviate from expected levels.203 
 The problem is demonstrated aptly by the recent disputes over traffic pumping, in which 
small carriers negotiated rates for terminating calls based on their historical call volumes, which 
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were quite low, and then radically increasing their terminating call volume by advertising free 
services that only terminate calls, such as conference calling or free adult chat-line services.  
These customers then advertise their conference calling or chat-line services on the Internet as 
free services.  In one case, traffic pumping caused terminating traffic to surge from 15,000 
minutes to 6.4 million minutes in a five-month span, which resulted in a $10-$15 million 
increase in revenue above expected levels.204 
 This example underscores the difficulty in setting rates when sales volumes are faced 
with considerable uncertainty.  This includes both variability around market share as well as 
uncertainty regarding the size of the overall market.  The dynamic nature of the Internet industry 
thus provides some reason to believe that policymakers will find it challenging to apply common 
carriage principles to the Internet. 
Conclusion 
 The judicial decision holding that including a nondiscrimination rule would be proper 
only if broadband Internet access were classified as a common carrier sparked strong interest 
among policymakers and network neutrality advocates in embracing common carriage as the 
basis for the Open Internet Order.  Unfortunately, they have often done so without taking into 
account common carriage’s limitations revealed in the academic commentary and its 
implementation history. 
 This Essay seeks to fill this void by suggesting a five-part framework for analyzing when 
common carriage is most likely to succeed.  The factors suggest that the modern Internet 
constitutes a poor candidate for successful common carriage regulation.  Assigning relative 
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weights to each factor and determining how likely common carriage is to be successful if some, 
but not all, of the criteria are met is left to future research.   
 The fact that history suggests that common carriage remedies are unlikely to be difficult 
to administer when imposed on the Internet raises what at first might appear to be a conundrum.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Trinko suggests that antitrust law is also poorly suited to 
oversee such access remedies.205  This raises the possibility that neither antitrust law nor 
regulation could address any potential problems.   
 On reflection, such a possibility should not be surprising.  Trinko reminds us that 
intervention under the antitrust laws is not costless and that liability should be imposed only 
when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs.206  This means that the costs of antitrust 
enforcement may counsel in favor abstaining from intervention even when the unregulated 
market would not perform in a perfectly competitive manner.  Instead, the imperfections of the 
remedies necessarily require policymakers to engage in a comparative second-best analysis and 
tolerate imperfect market performance when the would-be cure would be worse than the disease.   
 The same is true for regulation.  The fact that telecommunications regulation is costly 
similarly requires a comparison of second-best outcomes.  It may well be that the unregulated 
market would perform so badly that intervention would be better for consumers notwithstanding 
the costs associated with imposing that regulation.  Oligopolistic markets similarly fall short of 
the competitive ideal, but as the number of competitors increases, the economic performance of 
the unregulated market improves.  Eventually, the improvement in performance reaches the point 
where the balance between unregulated oligopoly and regulated oligopoly tips the other way and 
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policymakers find that the benefits of regulation no longer exceed the costs.207  It is important to 
bear in mind that at this point, the market still does not perform perfectly.  The comparative 
second-best analysis teaches us that sometimes there will be imperfections that the law is unable 
to remediate. 
 The recognition that the law cannot necessarily right every wrong is part of the growing 
humility over the past few decades about what the law can do.  Tempting as it might be to try to 
use the law to fix every problem that regulators can identify, a clear recognition the types of 
remedies that courts and regulators can manage effectively provides new insights into the proper 
limits of common carriage’s domain. 
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